Numbers

Claude View

The Numbers

AMR trades at $190 ($2.43B market cap, ~$2.07B EV) after an 80% 12-month round-trip from $112 (June 2025) to $254 (January 2026). The single variable that matters is non-GAAP margin per ton, which collapsed from $67.73 in FY23 to $14.85 in FY25 as the East Coast met index reset. With $359M of net cash, $7M of debt, and a $361M remaining buyback authorization, AMR is priced for through-cycle FCF — not last-twelve-months anything. The number most likely to rerate the stock: a recovery in committed realization above $135/ton (FY26 committed is $127.30 on 40% of volume).

All figures in USD. Price data as of 2026-04-16. Financial statements through FY2025 (Dec-31-2025). Quarterly OCF series rebased to isolated quarters (10-Q filings report Q1–Q3 as YTD-cumulative).

Price & Valuation Snapshot

Price (USD)

$189.91

Market Cap ($M)

$2,429

Enterprise Value ($M)

$2,071

Net Cash ($M)

$359

Price / Book

1.57

EV / EBITDA (TTM)

21.7

Book Value / Share

$120.8

P/E (TTM, loss)

-40.0

From a $97 low (June 2025) to a $254 high (January 2026) — a 162% intra-year range on the same producing asset base. The volatility is the index, not the company.

The 12-month range ($97–$254) is wider than the median S&P energy name moves in five years. AMR is effectively a levered call option on the East Coast met coal index. Sizing matters more than thesis.

Revenue & Earnings Power

Revenue fell 39% peak-to-trough in 24 months. Net income swung from +$722M to −$62M — a $784M delta on roughly the same 15–17M ton output. This is the amplitude an investor must underwrite.

Cash Generation & Capital Return

OCF compressed 83% from the FY23 peak. Capex held steady at $167–231M/year, so cash available for return collapsed. FY25 cash returned ($52M) is the lowest in three years — disciplined, not blind.

Cash at Dec-25 ($M)

$366

Net Cash ($M)

$359

Buyback Remaining ($M)

$361

Isolated quarterly OCF — the cycle in motion

2023-Q2 OCF ($317M) alone exceeds all of FY25 ($145M). The quarterly cash engine moves from firehose to trickle entirely on index. This is why net-cash survival matters more than quarter-to-quarter earnings power.

AMR's capital-return philosophy is visible in the numbers: aggressive when cash is abundant, near-zero when it isn't. No regular dividend means no forced equity issuance at the trough. The $361M remaining authorization is a coiled spring, not an obligation.

Share count has shrunk from 15.3M (2023-Q1 weighted diluted) to 12.86M (2025-Q4) — a 16% reduction. That compounding matters: in any future $50 margin-per-ton environment, there are 2.4M fewer shares sharing the cash.

Balance Sheet — The Survival Engine

Equity has held $1.55B–$1.65B through an entire down-cycle. Cash peaked at $482M in Dec-24, drifted to $366M in Dec-25 as working capital and sustaining capex exceeded OCF. Total debt is a rounding error ($7M).

Debt / Equity

0.005

Current Ratio

4.47

Quick Ratio

3.53

Cash Ratio

1.78

AMR is not in the conversation on solvency risk. Current ratio of 4.47× and a cash ratio of 1.78× mean the company could retire every current liability in cash and still have $160M left. This is the reason the equity survives a $15/ton margin environment — the peers with real leverage can't.

Per-Ton Economics — The Only Number That Matters

Price fell $62/ton (-35%) from FY23 to FY25. Cost fell only $9/ton (-8%). Margin compressed 78%. This is the defining chart for AMR's income statement — everything below gross profit is downstream of this.

FY26 committed book

No Results

Guidance: 15.1–16.5M met tons for FY26, 40% committed/priced at $127.30/ton. Domestic locked at $136.30 — that's better than FY25 realization ($117). But only 40% is locked, meaning 60% of FY26 revenue is still at the mercy of spot index.

Peer Comparison — One Table, Decision-Oriented

No Results

Takeaways: (1) On pure-play met, AMR vs HCC is the only apples-to-apples compare — HCC trades at a 34% P/B premium (2.11× vs 1.57×) for slightly higher leverage and positive TTM earnings. (2) ARCH is cheapest on P/E (13.6×) but carries thermal dilution. (3) METC's 68.7× EV/EBITDA reflects rare-earth optionality, not coal fundamentals — ignore. (4) BTU is the only peer trading below book (0.93×), but it is structurally thermal.

The AMR vs HCC spread is the trade to watch. If you believe both are pure-play cyclical proxies, the P/B gap (1.57 vs 2.11) will compress — either by AMR rerating on margin recovery, or by HCC derating on Blue Creek capex disappointment.

Scatter — Gross margin vs leverage

AMR's position (bottom-left) is textbook trough: low leverage, low current margin. Only HCC offers the combination of higher margin with low leverage — the post-cycle target. METC's top-right (high leverage, low margin) is the no-fly zone.

Institutional Ownership Snapshot

No Results

BlackRock alone holds 14.7% of shares outstanding — an ETF/index footprint, not active conviction. Beyond that, the holder list is a collection of quant and multi-strat funds. There is no dominant active strategic holder, meaning AMR's cap table rebalances quickly on flow-driven moves.

Normalized Earnings Power — The Valuation Anchor

The only defensible way to value AMR is through-cycle. Here is the bridge, at three different assumed normalized margins, using 15M tons of sustainable volume and 12.86M fully-diluted shares (effective tax rate 21%):

No Results

At $75/ton normalized margin, AMR earns ~$63 EPS. At a trough-mid $50, it earns ~$40. At today's $15/ton, it loses money. The market price of $190 implies the buyer thinks margins will normalize somewhere between $25 and $50/ton — defensible. The upside bet: $75+ normalized margin is worth $250+ at a 4× P/E.

This is a scenario analysis, not a forecast. The key assumption is **15M tons of stable volume** — if AMR shrinks the asset base (mine idlings that become permanent), normalized EPS drops proportionally. Watch volume guidance next quarter, not just price.

What the Numbers Confirm, Contradict, and What to Watch

Confirm: The balance sheet is bulletproof. $359M net cash, 4.47× current ratio, and only $7M debt mean AMR is not a going-concern story at any reasonable commodity price. The buyback discipline is real — $1.14B of execution in 2022–23 with a hard pause at trough. Share count is down 16% in two years.

Contradict: Five consecutive quarters of GAAP losses. FY25 gross margin is 9.6% — lower than every peer except the merger-disfigured CNR. Inventory has risen to $193M (9% of FY25 revenue), a subtle sign that volume isn't finding buyers at index prices. Q4-25 FCF was negative $9.8M despite reported full-year FCF of $18M — the trend is worsening, not stabilizing.

Watch next quarter (Q1-26 reports in late April/early May):

Committed/priced % vs. $127.30 — if AMR locks more domestic volume above $140/ton as the contracting season plays out, FY26 EPS swings materially higher.

Kingston Wildcat first production — Q1-26 is the guided start. Every 100Kt of low-vol at a $20/ton premium to the average book is worth $2M of EBITDA.

Cash burn rate — if cash drops below $300M in H1-26, the buyback stays paused longer, and the valuation math shifts from "cash-rich call option" to "priced for normalization."

Industry signal: Queensland supply and APLV spot — the single best leading indicator for AMR's realization next quarter.